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Abstract
Tournament organizers supposedly design rules such that a team cannot be
better off by exerting a lower effort. It is shown that the European qualifiers to
the 2018 FIFA World Cup are not strategy-proof in this sense: a team might be
eliminated if it wins in the last matchday of group stage, while it advances to play-
offs by playing a draw, provided that all other results do not change. An example
reveals that this scenario could have happened in October 2017, after four-fifth
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group-based qualification systems.
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1 Introduction
One important role of scientific research is to inform decision-makers about the possible
properties, especially failures of different rules and formulas. It is an essential issue on the
field of sport, since a bad regulation can easily lead to public outrage: one recent example
was Badminton at the 2012 Summer Olympics – Women’s doubles (Kendall and Lenten,
2017, Section 3.3.1). It is not an unknown phenomenon in football1, too, as illustrated by
Barbados vs. Grenada (1994 Caribbean Cup qualification) (Kendall and Lenten, 2017,
Section 3.9.4), or the notorious ’Nichtangriffspakt (Schande) von Gijo´n’2 (Kendall and
Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.1). A number of similar cases are discussed in Kendall and
Lenten (2017).
These negative events may have contributed to the increasing popularity of operations
research analysis of sport ranking rules (Gerchak, 1994; Wright, 2009, 2014), and to the
recent application of an axiomatic approach towards sport rankings (Berker, 2014; Csato´,
2017b,d; Vaziri et al., 2017). We aim to continue this research direction by analysing some
qualification tournaments with respect to manipulability / strategy-proofness / incentive
compatibility. If this condition doe not hold, teams3 might have a possibility to gain by
performing worse in certain matches.
Specifically, the qualifiers to two prominent football competitions, to the UEFA Eu-
ropean Championships and FIFA World Cups in the European Zone will be discussed
from this point of view. We get a negative result as the monotonicity of rankings for
each separate subtournaments of the qualifier is seemingly not enough to guarantee
strategy-proofness for the whole qualification system.
The root of the problem has still been revealed by a column in the case of the European
qualification for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil (Dagaev and Sonin, 2013), and has
been described by Dagaev and Sonin (2017) in a sentence: ’Two months before the end of
the tournament, with 80% of games completed, there still was a scenario under which a
team might need to achieve a draw instead of winning to go to Brazil.’4
This paper outlines a similar scenario for 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)
by showing that a team might be eliminated if it wins in the last matchday of group
stage, but it advances to play-offs by playing a draw, provided that all other results do
not change. Crucially, the example takes the outcome of matches played before October
2017 and the appearance of the first version of the current paper (Csato´, 2017a) as given.
After a detailed presentation of the particular example, we formalize the problem of
group-based qualification tournaments. A pair of theorems lists the conditions of strategy-
proofness and incentive incompatibility, respectively. They are applied to identify nine
recent qualification systems, which open a way to manipulation. Finally, we suggest a
mechanism for tournament organizers in order to address the problem.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related literature.
Section 3 describes the real-world example, the European section of the 2018 FIFA World
Cup qualification. The incentive incompatibility of this qualification is proved in Section 4.
The main model is presented and analysed in Section 5, and is applied to examine the
1 Throughout the paper, we take the European meaning of football, rather than the US meaning.
2 Kendall and Lenten (2017) use the term ’Shame of Gijo´n’, and Wikipedia calls it ’Disgrace of Gijo´n’.
3 The word team is used because of the example, but they can also be players in other settings.
4 We have written the first version of the paper (Csato´, 2017a) without knowing about Dagaev and
Sonin (2013) or Dagaev and Sonin (2017). While it is not an excuse for the originality of the current
research, this fact indicates that the failure of qualification rules is almost obvious. It is worth to note
that Dagaev and Sonin (2017) also build on a ’borrowed’ real-world example.
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strategy-proofness of several qualification systems in Section 6. Section 7 formulates policy
implications for tournament organizers, and Section 8 concludes.
The paper is written both for the public and the scientific community. Decision-makers
not interested in or not familiar with the theoretical background of manipulation can skip
Sections 2, 5 and maybe 2 as well as 3, in order to focus on the example presented in
Section 4 and the possible remedies in Section 7.
2 Related work
Ranking in sport tournaments is closely related to the problem of preference aggregation.
In social choice theory, a number of articles have dealt with the axiomatic properties
of different aggregation rules (see, e.g., Arrow (1950); Rubinstein (1980); Chebotarev
(1994); Chebotarev and Shamis (1998); van den Brink and Gilles (2003); Slutzki and Volij
(2005, 2006); Altman and Tennenholtz (2008); van den Brink and Gilles (2009); Gonza´lez-
Dı´az et al. (2014); Csato´ (2017c)). For example, the well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite
(Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) and the more general Duggan-Schwartz (Duggan and
Schwartz, 2000) theorems state that fairness is not compatible with strategy-proofness,
that is, if a voting rule is fair, there always exists a voter who can achieve a better outcome
by tactical voting.
Some recent works have analysed incentive (in)compatibility of sport ranking rules.
Stanton and Williams (2013) investigate double-elimination tournaments (a competition
where no participant is eliminated until it lost two matches) and show that they are
vulnerable to manipulation by a coalition of players who can improve their chance of
winning by throwing matches. Russell and Walsh (2009) and Schneider et al. (2016) also
discuss manipulation by coalitions through a collusion between several teams. Pauly (2014)
develops a mathematical model of strategic manipulation in round-robin subtournaments
and derives an impossibility theorem. Vong (2017) considers the strategic manipulation
problem in multistage tournaments and shows that it is necessary to allow only the
top-ranked player to qualify from each group in order to guarantee that all of them exert
full effort. Dagaev and Sonin (2017) prove that tournament systems, consisting of multiple
round-robin and knock-out tournaments with noncumulative prizes, are characteristically
incentive incompatible. Brams and Ismail (2016) and Brams et al. (2016) address the
strategy-proofness of certain sporting rules, too. Russell (2010) studies the complexity
of manipulation strategies in knock-out and round-robin tournaments and presents some
algorithms which are able to identify with high accuracy whether a coalition is manipulating
the tournament. Lasek et al. (2016) suggest some strategies for improving a team’s position
in the official ranking of international football teams compiled by FIFA.
Some occurrences of incentive incompatibility (like the Badminton scandal of the 2012
Olympics, which probably inspired Pauly (2014) and Vong (2017)) are based on the fact
that being ranked lower in the qualification tournament might lead to a more preferred
competitor in the following knock-out stage. In this paper, similarly to Dagaev and Sonin
(2017), we do not address this probabilistic aspect of manipulation (note that facing
another competitor only means advantage in expected terms), and discuss only cases when
a team is strictly better off by exerting a lower effort.
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3 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)
2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) is a short denomination of the European
section of the 2018 FIFA5 World Cup qualification, the qualifier of national association
football teams which are members of UEFA6 to the 2018 FIFA World Cup, to be held
in Russia.7 With the admission of Gibraltar and Kosovo as FIFA members in May
2016, 54 teams compete in this qualification for 13 slots in the final tournament (Russia
automatically qualifies as a host).
The qualifying format was confirmed by the UEFA Executive Committee meeting on
22-23 March 2015 in Vienna. The qualification structure is as follows:
∙ Group stage (first round): Nine groups of six teams each, playing home-and-away
round-robin matches. The winners of each group qualify for the 2018 FIFA World
Cup, and the eight best runners-up advance to play-offs (second round).
∙ Play-offs (second round): The eight best second-placed teams from the group
stage play home-and-away matches over two legs. The four winners qualify for
the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
We focus on the first round. FIFA (2016, Article 20.4a) specifies this stage.
The matches shall be played in accordance with one of the following three formats:
a) in groups composed of several teams on a home-and-away basis, with three points
for a win, one point for a draw and no points for a defeat (league format);
Tie-breaking rules in the groups are detailed in FIFA (2016, Article 20.6).
In the league format, the ranking in each group is determined as follows:
a) greatest number of points obtained in all group matches;
b) goal difference in all group matches;
c) greatest number of goals scored in all group matches.
If two or more teams are equal on the basis of the above three criteria, their rankings shall
be determined as follows:
d) greatest number of points obtained in the group matches between the teams con-
cerned;
e) goal difference resulting from the group matches between the teams concerned;
f) greater number of goals scored in all group matches between the teams concerned;
5 FIFA stands for Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association, French for International Federation
of Association Football, which is the international governing body of association football, futsal, and
beach soccer.
6 UEFA stands for Union of European Football Associations, the administrative body for association
football in Europe. However, several UEFA member states are primarily or entirely located in Asia. It is
one of the six continental confederations of world football’s governing body FIFA.
7 This section is mainly based on the Wikipedia page of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA).
We will cite only those official documents which concern the ranking of teams.
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g) the goals scored away from home count double between the teams concerned (if
the tie is only between two teams).
h) fair play points system in which the number of yellow and red cards in all group
matches is considered according to the following deductions:
– first yellow card: minus 1 point
– second yellow card/indirect red card: minus 3 points
– direct red card: minus 4 points
– yellow card and direct red card: minus 5 points;
i) drawing of lots by the FIFA Organising Committee.
Strangely, FIFA (2016, Article 20.6) does not state explicitly that greater goal differences
and fair play points are preferred.8 Choice of the eight best second-placed teams is not
addressed in this document. FIFA (2016, Article 20.8) only describes that
Should the best second- or third-placed team within a group stage qualify for the next stage
or for the final competition, the criteria to decide such best second- or third-placed team
shall depend on the competition format and shall require the approval of FIFA following
proposals from the confederations.
Unfortunately, we were not able to find the relevant regulation of UEFA. But, according
to a FIFA (FIFA, 2017) Media Release (reinforced by an UEFA news (UEFA, 2016)),
the eight best runners-up will be decided by ranking criteria as stated in the 2018 FIFA
World Cup Regulations, namely points, goal difference, goals scored, goals scored away from
home and disciplinary ranking, with the results against teams ranked 6th not being taken
into account.
Since head-to-head results are nonexistent in the comparison of runners-up, the ranking
of second-placed teams strictly follow tie-breaking in groups, with the crucial difference of
discarding two matches played against the last team of the group.9
8 The purpose of mixing words greater and greatest is not clear for us. Note also the inconsistent use
of the word all before group matches.
9 However, it seems that there were some controversy around the ranking of second-placed teams.
According to our knowledge, FIFA and UEFA did not publish the ranking of second-placed teams before
the end of group stage. The Spanish Wikipedia page of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)
ranked the runners-up on the basis of all matches played even on 12 September 2017. Most Wikipedia
pages of the qualification, like the English, French, or Hungarian have placed Sweden on the 6th and
Montenegro on the 7th position on 12 September 2017, after eight matchdays were played. On the other
hand, Montenegro was the 6th and Sweden the 7th in German and Italian. As one can check in Tables 2
and A.4, Sweden and Montenegro had the same goal difference (+3) and number of goals scored (10) at
that time. Furthermore, both teams scored 4 goals away from home. There is a difference in the goals
against them at home, other teams of the group (without the last) had scored 2 goals in Sweden and 3 in
Montenegro. It may be a weak argument to rank Sweden higher, nevertheless, in the lack of exact rules,
we are not sure. It is also possible that disciplinary points count, but then with or without the matches
against the last team? Anyway, it is rather an academic issue as it obviously does not influence which
teams advance to play-offs.
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Another confederation of FIFA, the AFC (Asian Football Confederation) has published
a Media Release (AFC, 2015) on the ranking of runners-up.10 AFC (2015, Case 2) also
provides an illustration on how to calculate a ranking of second-placed teams when some
group matches are discarded.
We will see that this, seemingly minor, modification in the comparison of second-placed
teams has some unintended consequences regarding manipulation.
4 How 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)
can be manipulated?
In this section we will present a possible manipulation of the European qualifiers to the
2018 FIFA World Cup. Matches of the first eight matchdays – to be played between 4
September 2016 and 5 September 2017 – are assumed to be given as they were known
when the first version of the paper (Csato´, 2017a) was made publicly available.11
Theorem 4.1. It might still happen after four-fifth of all matches are over that 2018 FIFA
World Cup qualification (UEFA) can be manipulated by Bulgaria playing a draw instead of
a win against Luxembourg in the last matchday, on 10 October 2017.
Proof. We provide an example by generating results for the last two matchdays, to be
played between 5 October 2017 and 10 October 2017.12 Eight groups are shown in the
Appendix: Table A.1 presents Group B; Table A.2 presents Group C; Table A.3 presents
Group D; Table A.4 presents Group E; Table A.5 presents Group F; Table A.6 presents
Group G; Table A.7 presents Group H; and Table A.8 presents Group I.
Since the manipulation may occur Group A, it is discussed in detail here. Table 1
shows a possible scenario in this group. Note that some hypothetical results of Table 1.b
may be unreasonable, like Belarus defeating Netherlands by 7-0. They are necessary to
create the appropriate conditions for manipulation. Nevertheless, this set of match results
has at least positive probability to be realized after eight matchdays are over.
On the basis of standings in Group A-I, runners-up are ranked in Table 2. Only the
eight best second-places team advance to play-offs, hence Bulgaria is eliminated.
However, consider what happens if Bulgaria plays a draw of 1-1 against Luxembourg
in the last matchday, which takes place on 10 October 2017 in Group A. It is clear that
this change worsen Bulgaria’s standing in the group. Nevertheless, it still remains on
the second place with 16 points as both Bulgaria and Sweden would have the same goal
difference (+4) with Bulgaria scoring more goals in all group matches (22 vs. 18) in the
10 Second-placed teams should be ranked in the second round of the Asian section of the 2018 FIFA
World Cup qualification, organized for national teams which are members of AFC. AFC (2015) lists the
following criteria as tie-breaking rules for the comparison of runners-up: greatest number of points obtained
from group matches; goal difference in group matches; greatest number of goals scored in group matches;
fewer number of points calculated according to the number of yellow and red cards received by the team;
drawing of lots. Number of goals scored away from home does not appear among the criteria and the
preferred direction of goal difference is not specified, although it is provided for fair play points in contrast
to FIFA (2017, Article 20.6).
11 Perhaps the best summary of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) is its Wikipedia page, too.
However, a national team in Group G was referred to as Macedonia (at least on 12 September 2017), while
its official name used by FIFA and UEFA is FYR Macedonia, as the country was admitted by United
Nations under the provisional description the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
12 It is worth to note that all teams play one match home and one away in the last two matchdays,
which is not necessarily true for two subsequent matchdays.
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Table 1: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group A
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 France — 2-1 4-0 4-1 0-0 10 Oct
2 Sweden 2-1 — 1-1 3-0 7 Oct 4-0
3 Netherlands 0-1 10 Oct — 3-1 5-0 4-1
4 Bulgaria 7 Oct 3-2 2-0 — 4-3 1-0
5 Luxembourg 1-3 0-1 1-3 10 Oct — 1-0
6 Belarus 0-0 0-4 7 Oct 2-1 1-1 —
(b) Hypothetical match results of the last two matchdays
Last row shows an alternative result, obtained if Bulgaria manipulates
Date Home team Away team Result
7 October 2017 Sweden Luxemburg 0-4
7 October 2017 Belarus Netherlands 7-0
7 October 2017 Bulgaria France 8-0
10 October 2017 France Belarus 1-0
10 October 2017 Luxemburg Bulgaria 0-1
10 October 2017 Netherlands Sweden 3-0
10 October 2017* Luxemburg* Bulgaria* 1-1*
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drown; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last but one row contains the second-placed team’s benchmark results, adjusted for the ranking of the
runners-up (matches played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Last row contains the second-placed team’s alternative results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up
(matches played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017), obtained if Bulgaria
manipulates.
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 France 6 2 2 16 13 3 20
2 Bulgaria 6 0 4 22 17 5 18
3 Sweden 5 1 4 18 14 4 16
4 Netherlands 5 1 4 19 18 1 16
5 Belarus 2 2 6 11 17 -6 8
6 Luxembourg 2 2 6 11 18 -7 8
2 Bulgaria 4 0 4 17 14 3 12
2* Bulgaria* 4* 1* 3* 20* 16* 4* 13*
alternative scenario. On the other hand, Luxembourg overtakes Belarus thanks to its
newly obtained draw since it has the same goal difference (−6) with more goals scored
(12 vs. 11). In the ranking of second-placed teams, matches against the last team are
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Table 2: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – Ranking of second-placed teams
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drown; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points.
Since matches played against the 6th team in each group are discarded (FIFA, 2017), all teams have
played 8 matches taken into account.
Last row contains Bulgaria’s alternative results, obtained if it manipulates.
Pos Team Group W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Portugal B 6 1 1 23 5 18 19
2 Italy G 6 1 1 14 8 6 19
3 Northern Ireland C 4 2 2 9 3 6 14
4 Wales D 3 5 0 8 5 3 14
5 Turkey I 4 2 2 8 8 0 14
6 Slovakia F 4 1 3 11 5 6 13
7 Greece H 3 4 1 8 4 4 13
8 Montenegro E 3 3 2 12 6 6 12
9 Bulgaria A 4 0 4 17 14 3 12
7* Bulgaria* A 4* 1* 3* 20* 16* 4* 13*
discarded. Consequently, Bulgaria would have 13 points, placing it seventh among the
runners-up according to Table 2 (it has the same goal difference as Greece with more goals
scored). Thus Bulgaria would advance to play-offs instead of Montenegro if it would allow
a goal for Luxembourg.
According to the example presented, there exists a set of match results (even after eight
matchdays are over) such that Bulgaria advances to play-offs instead of being eliminated if
it concedes a goal in its last match, provided that all other results are fixed. Montenegro
is eliminated only as a consequence this unfair act, so it would have a strong argument to
protest against the current rules applied by FIFA and UEFA.
It is worth to note that the example used for the proof of Theorem 4.1 is robust with
respect to Groups B-I. If one considers the actual match results for these groups (still
known at this moment) instead of our hypothetical ones, Slovakia is the worst second-
placed teams with 12 points and a goal difference of +5 among the runner-ups. Bulgaria is
still eliminated by winning against Luxembourg according to Table 1.c, but is advanced to
play-offs if it plays a draw of 1-1. Manipulation mainly depends on the events in Group A.
5 Theoretical background
In the following, we build a model for the group stage of a qualification, where groups are
home-and-away round-robin tournaments.
Definition 5.1. Home-and-away round-robin tournament: Let 𝑋 be a nonempty finite set
of at least two teams, 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 be two teams and 𝑣 : 𝑋×𝑋 → {(𝑣1; 𝑣2) : 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ N}∪{—}
be a function such that 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = — if and only if 𝑥 = 𝑦. The pair (𝑋, 𝑣) is called a
home-and-away round-robin tournament.
In a home-and-away round-robin tournament, any two teams play each other once
at home and once at away. Function 𝑣 describes game results with the number of goals
scored by home and away teams, respectively.
9
Definition 5.2. Ranking in home-and-away round-robin tournaments: Let 𝒳 be the set
of home-and-away round-robin tournaments with a set of teams 𝑋. A ranking method 𝑆
is a function that maps any characteristic function 𝑣 of 𝒳 into a strict order 𝑆(𝑣) on the
set 𝑋.
Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be a home-and-away round-robin tournament, 𝑆(𝑣) be its ranking and
𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦 be two different teams. 𝑥 is ranked higher (lower) than 𝑦 if and only if
𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦 (𝑥 ≺𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦).
Let 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 be two different teams and 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦); 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)). It is said
that team 𝑥 wins over team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) < 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (away),
team 𝑥 loses to team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) < 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (away) and
teams 𝑥 draws with team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦).
Definition 5.3. Number of points: Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be a home-and-away round-robin tournament
and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team. Denote by 𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) the number of wins and by 𝑁𝑑𝑣 (𝑥) the number
of draws of team 𝑥 in (𝑋, 𝑣), respectively. The number of points of team 𝑥 is 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) =
𝛼𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) +𝑁𝑑𝑣 (𝑥) such that 𝛼 ≥ 2.
In other words, a win means 𝛼 points, a draw means 1 point and a loss means 0 points.
Number of points does not necessarily give a strict order on the set of teams, so some
tie-breaking rules should be introduced.
Definition 5.4. Goal difference: Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be a home-and-away round-robin tournament
and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team. The goal difference of team 𝑥 is
𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑥) =
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋,𝑦 ̸=𝑥
(𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)) +
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋,𝑦 ̸=𝑥
(𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥)) .
Goal difference is the difference of the number of goals scored for team 𝑥 and the
number of goals scored against team 𝑥.
Definition 5.5. Head-to-head results: Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be a home-and-away round-robin tour-
nament and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team. Denote by 𝐿 ⊆ 𝑋 ∖ {𝑥} a set of teams.
The head-to-head number of points of team 𝑥 with respect to 𝐿 in (𝑋, 𝑣) is
𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) = 𝛼 (| {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)} |+ | {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)} |) +
+| {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)} |+ | {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) = 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)} |
The head-to-head goal difference of team 𝑥 with respect to 𝐿 in (𝑋, 𝑣) is
𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) =
∑︁
𝑦∈𝐿
(𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)) +
∑︁
𝑦∈𝐿
(𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥)) .
Definition 5.6. Monotonicity of group ranking: Let 𝒳 be the set of home-and-away
round-robin tournaments with a set of teams 𝑋, and 𝑆 be a ranking method. 𝑆 is
monotonic if for any characteristic function 𝑣 and for any different teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦:
1. 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) > 𝑠𝑣(𝑦)⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦;
2. 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑦), 𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑦) and 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) > 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑧) or 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) = 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑧) and 𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) >
𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑦) for all 𝑧 ∈ 𝐿 where 𝐿 is the set of all teams not ranked lower or higher
than 𝑥 by criterion 1 and the recursive application of criterion 2 ⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦.
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Monotonicity implies that (a) a team should be ranked higher if it has a greater number
of points (criterion 1); (b) a team should be ranked higher compared to another with the
same number of points, an inferior goal difference and worse head-to-head results against
all teams currently ranked equally (criterion 2). Monotonicity still does not imply that
the ranking is unique. The complexity of the definition is necessary in order to cover the
different tie-breaking rules recently applied by FIFA (goal difference) and UEFA (recursive
head-to-head results). Berker (2014, Table 6) gives a short overview of them.
Definition 5.7. Group-based qualifier : A group-based qualifier 𝒯 consists of 𝑘 groups of
home-and-away round-robin tournaments with the set of teams 𝑋1, 𝑋2, . . . , 𝑋𝑘.
Definition 5.8. Allocation rule of a group-based qualifier : An allocation rule of a group-
based qualifier 𝒯 is a function ℛ : 𝒳 1 ×𝒳 2 × · · · × 𝒳 𝑘 × ∪𝑛𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖 → {0; 1; 2}.
Consider a group-based qualifier 𝒯 , its allocation rule ℛ, a set of group results
𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
and a team 𝑥 ∈ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖. Team 𝑥 is said to be (a) directly qualified if
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 2; (b) advanced to the next round with a chance to qualify if ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 1; (c)
eliminated if ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0.
Definition 5.9. Qualification system: The pair (𝒯 ,ℛ) of a group-based qualifier 𝒯 and
its allocation rule ℛ is a qualification system.
In order to fit 2018 FIFAWorld Cup qualification (UEFA) into this model, the allocation
rule is allowed to compare teams from different groups in an extra group.
Definition 5.10. Extra group function: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system. Extra
group function 𝒢 associates to any set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
a set of teams
𝑋𝑘+1 ⊆ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖 and a set 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 ⊆ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1.
Definition 5.11. Extra group ranking: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system and 𝒢 be an
extra group function. An extra group ranking method 𝑄 is a function that maps any set of
group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
into a strict order on the set 𝑋𝑘+1.
Definition 5.12. Ranking in extra group: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system and 𝒢 be
an extra group function. Then the number of points in the extra group of team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 is
𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) = 𝛼
(︁
|
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦)
}︁
|+ |
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣𝑖2(𝑦, 𝑥)
}︁
|
)︁
+
+|
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦)
}︁
|+ |
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) = 𝑣𝑖2(𝑦, 𝑥)
}︁
|
The goal difference in the extra group of team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 is
𝑔𝑑𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) =
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋𝑖𝑥
(︁
𝑣𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦)
)︁
+
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋𝑖𝑥
(︁
𝑣𝑖2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥)
)︁
.
Note that teams of 𝑋𝑘+1 have not necessarily played against each other (head-to-head
results may be unknown) since there are no further matches in the extra group, but their
number of points and goal difference can be defined on the basis of certain group matches.
Definition 5.13. Monotonicity of extra group ranking: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a group-based
qualification system and 𝒢 be an extra group function. Extra group ranking 𝑄 is said
to be monotonic if for any set of group results 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘} and for any different
teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦:
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1. 𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) > 𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑦)⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦;
2. 𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) = 𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑦) and 𝑔𝑑𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑦)⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦.
Definition 5.13 is more simple than Definition 5.6 due to the lack of head-to-head
results in the extra group.
Definition 5.14. Fairness of an allocation rule: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a group-based qualification
system. Allocation rule ℛ is fair if:
∙ there exists a common monotonic ranking 𝑆 in each group such that 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖,
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 and 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦 implies ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) ≥ ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦);
∙ there exists an extra group function 𝒢 such that 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 implies |𝑋 𝑖𝑥| = |𝑋 𝑖𝑦|;
∙ there exists a monotonic extra group ranking 𝑄 such that 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 and
𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦 implies ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) ≥ ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦).
The idea behind a fair allocation rule is straightforward. Application of a monotonic
ranking in groups ensures that teams have no incentive to exert a lower effort during a
match since they cannot achieve a higher position in the group by deliberately playing
worse. This should also be true in the extra group, hence extra group ranking 𝑄 is required
to satisfy monotonicity. The second condition is responsible for fairness in the comparison
of teams from different groups: their number of matches considered in the extra group
should be the same, otherwise number of scores is not a good measure of performance as
it cannot decrease if a team plays more matches.
Perhaps these ideas have inspired the decision-makers of FIFA and UEFA.
Definition 5.15. Manipulation: Consider a qualification system (𝒯 ,ℛ) and a set of
group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
. A team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 can manipulate the qualification
system (𝒯 ,ℛ) if there exists a set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
such that
𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) and 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) ≥ 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 and ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) < ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑥).
Manipulation means that team 𝑥 can improve its position with respect to qualification
by letting its opponents to score more goals.
Definition 5.16. Strategy-proofness: A qualification system (𝒯 ,ℛ) is called strategy-proof
if there exists no set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
such that a team can manipulate
it.
Our main results concern the strategy-proofness of qualification systems with a fair
allocation rule.
Theorem 5.1. Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system such that ℛ is a fair allocation rule
and the following conditions hold:
∙ the number of groups is at least 𝑘 ≥ 2;
∙ there is a difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group, that is, if
𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1, then there exists 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 such that ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) ̸= ℛ(𝑉, 𝑧);
∙ there exists a team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋𝑘+1 such that
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ ℓ+ 1 and
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} if and only if ℓ =
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ 1.
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Then qualification system (𝒯 ,ℛ) does not satisfy strategy-proofness.
According to the second requirement of Theorem 5.1, teams of the extra group are
distinguished by the allocation rule. The third condition means that if a team is considered
in the extra group such that its matches played against the lowest ranked ℓ teams in its
group are discarded, then at least ℓ+ 1 teams ranked lower than it can be found in the
group.
Proof. An example is presented where a team can manipulate a qualification system that
satisfies all criteria of Theorem 5.1.
Table 3: Group 1 of Example 5.1
GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal difference; Pts = Points.
Last but one row contains the group winner’s benchmark results, adjusted for ranking in the extra group
(matches played against the last team are discarded) according to the allocation rule ℛ.
Last row contains the group winner’s alternative results, adjusted for ranking in the extra group (matches
played against the last team are discarded) according to the allocation rule ℛ, obtained if team 𝑎
manipulates.
Position Team 𝑎 𝑏 𝑐 GF GA GD Pts
1 𝑎 — 3-0 4-0 7 2 5 2𝛼 + 1
2 𝑏 2-0 — 1-0 3 6 -3 2𝛼
3 𝑐 0-0 3-0 — 3 4 -1 𝛼 + 1
1 𝑎 — — — 3 2 1 𝛼
1* 𝑎* — — — 4* 1* 3* 𝛼*
Example 5.1. Let 𝑘 = 2, 𝑋1 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} and 𝑋2 = {𝑑, 𝑒}.
Consider the fair allocation rule ℛ such that 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋3 if and only if 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦 for all
𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦, 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 =
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 1
}︁
and
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 if there exists a team 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≺𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦
0 if there exists a team 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 : 𝑥 ≺ 𝑦
2 otherwise
ℛ says that teams not winning their group are eliminated, the extra group consists of the
two remaining teams and the one ranked higher by 𝑄 – after the matches of the first team
against the third in Group 1 are discarded – qualifies.
A possible set of results in Group 1 is shown in Table 3. Team 𝑎 should be the first
since it has the most points (see criterion 1 of a monotonic group ranking method), and it
is considered in the extra group with 𝛼 points and a goal difference of +1 after discarding
the two matches against team 𝑐, the last in Group 1 due to criterion 1 of a monotonic
group ranking method (see the last but one row of Table 3).
There are only two matches to be played in Group 2. Let 𝑣2 be given such that
𝑣2(𝑑, 𝑒) = (3; 0) and 𝑣2(𝑒, 𝑑) = (1; 0). Then team 𝑑 should be the first (see criterion 2 of a
monotonic group ranking method) and would be considered in the extra group with 𝛼
points and a goal difference of +2. Consequently, ℛ(𝑉, 𝑎) = 0 and ℛ(𝑉, 𝑑) = 1 due to
criterion 2 of a monotonic extra group ranking method.
However, examine what happens when 𝑣1(𝑐, 𝑎) = (1; 0). Then teams 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐 have 2𝛼
points, but team 𝑎 has the same head-to-head number of points and better head-to-head
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goal difference compared to either 𝑏 or 𝑐, thus it is ranked first. Furthermore, team 𝑐 has
the same head-to-head number of points and better head-to-head goal difference compared
to 𝑏, so it would be the second. This ranking is based on criterion 2 of a monotonic group
ranking method. Consequently, team 𝑎 is considered with 𝛼 points and a goal difference
of +3 in the extra group (see the last row of Table 3), thus ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑎) = 1 and ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑑) = 0
due to criterion 2 of a monotonic extra group ranking method.
To summarize, team 𝑎 has an opportunity to manipulate this qualification structure
under a set of group results 𝑉 , so it is not strategy-proof.
Example 5.1 has the least possible number of teams, three in the first and two in the
second group. It is clear that the number of groups and the number of teams in them as well
as parameter ℓ can be increased without changing the essence of the counterexample.
Remark 5.1. 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), discussed in Section 3, fits into
the model presented above. The number of groups is 𝑘 = 9 and the allocation rule ℛ is as
follows:
∙ 𝑆 is monotonic because number of points is the first and goal difference is the
second tie-breaker in groups;
∙ 𝑄 is monotonic because number of points is the first and goal difference is the
second tie-breaker in the extra group;
∙ the first-placed team in each group qualifies: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 2 for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 if and
only if @𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑥;
∙ the third-, fourth-, fifth- and sixth-placed teams in each group are eliminated:
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0 for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 if
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ 2;
∙ the extra group consists of the second-placed teams: 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 if and only if⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 1;
∙ matches against the sixth-placed team are discarded in the extra group: if
𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1, then 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ (𝑋 𝑖𝑥 ∪ {𝑥}) if and only if 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑧 for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑧};
∙ the worst second-placed team is eliminated: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0 if 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 and
𝑦 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑥 for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 ∖ {𝑥};
∙ the eight best second-placed teams are advanced to the next round: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 1
if 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 and ∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 : 𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦.
Allocation rule ℛ is fair due to the monotonicity of ranking methods 𝑆 and 𝑄 together
with |𝑋 𝑖𝑣| = 5 for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1.
Proposition 5.1. 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) is not strategy-proof.
Proof. The scenario presented in the proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that team Bulgaria =
𝑥 ∈ 𝑋1 can manipulate since there exist sets of group results 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣9} and
𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣9} such that 𝑣1 = 𝑣1 with the exception of 𝑣11(𝑦, 𝑥) = 1 > 0 = 𝑣11(𝑦, 𝑥),
where team Luxembourg = 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋1 and ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0 < 1 = ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑥).
Theorem 5.1 can also be applied because of Remark 5.1: the allocation rule is fair,
the number of groups is 9 > 2, ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) can be 0 or 1 if team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 is in the extra
group, and, finally, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋𝑘+1 implies that
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 4, furthermore,
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} if and only if
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 1.
14
Theorem 5.1 can also be used to show that 2014 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA),
which divided 53 teams into eight groups with six and one group with five, does not satisfy
strategy-proofness. Note that Dagaev and Sonin (2013) have still verified the incentive
incompatibility of this qualifier.
Now we state a positive result, a ’pair’ of Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.2. Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system such that ℛ is a fair allocation rule
and at least one of the following conditions hold:
a) the number of groups is 𝑘 = 1;
b) there is no need for an extra group;
c) there is no difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group, that is,
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦) for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1;13
d) there exists no team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋𝑘+1 such that
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ ℓ+ 1 and
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} if and only if ℓ =
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ 1;
e) 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 is independent of 𝑣𝑖 for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1.
Then qualification system (𝒯 ,ℛ) satisfies strategy-proofness.
Proof. If there is only one group or there is no need for an extra group, monotonicity of 𝑆
provides strategy-proofness.
If there is no difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group, then a team may
improve its position in the extra group, but it has no incentives to cheat.
If all group matches are taken into account in the extra group or there exists no team
ranked lower in the group than team 𝑥 of the extra group such that matches against it are
not discarded in the extra group, than team 𝑥 cannot manipulate by changing the set of
its matches to be ignored because of the monotonicity of 𝑆 and 𝑄.
If 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 is independent of 𝑣𝑖, then ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑥) under any sets of group results 𝑉 ={︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
and 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
, so team 𝑥 has no way to manipulate.
6 On the strategy-proofness of some real-world qua-
lification systems
At this point, it is known from Dagaev and Sonin (2013) and Proposition 5.1 that
2014 and 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifications (UEFA) are not strategy-proof. In the
following, qualifications to the UEFA European Championships and FIFA World Cups
in the European Zone will be analysed with respect to this property. We have devised
Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 such that they will be enough to answer this question.
13 Note that allocation rule ℛ does not take seeding in play-offs into account. It is not a problem if
play-offs are drawn randomly (like in the UEFA Euro 2000 qualifying) or based on an exogenous ranking
of teams which is monotonic (like in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)). However, if, for
example, the best half of all teams advanced to play-offs from the extra group are placed in Pot 1, then
there is a difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group, despite it is not reflected by the allocation
rule ℛ.
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UEFA European Championship is hold every four years since 1960. The qualifications
for the tournaments between 1960 and 1992 were organized without an extra group, so
they was strategy-proof since condition b) of Theorem 5.2 is satisfied.
The 1996 qualifying consisted of seven groups with six and one group with five teams.
The winner of each group along with the six best runners-up qualified directly, and the two
worst runners-up met in a play-off. In the comparison of second-placed teams, only matches
played against teams that finished first, third and fourth were considered. The second and
third tie-breaking criteria were head-to-head number of points and goal difference, but they
were not used recursively. Nevertheless, this qualification system was not strategy-proof
because group and extra group ranking methods satisfied monotonicity, so Theorem 5.1
could be applied.
In 2000, the best runner-up qualified directly and the eight other were advanced to
play-offs from the five groups of five teams and four groups of six teams. In the comparison
of second-placed teams, matches played against teams that finished fifth or sixth were
discarded. Consequently, it did not satisfy strategy-proofness as tie-breaking rules were
the same as in the 1996 qualifying.
The 2004 and 2008 qualifying contained no extra group, they were strategy-proof
because of condition b) of Theorem 5.2.
The 2012 qualification had six groups of six teams and three groups of five teams.
The first-placed teams and the best second-placed team qualified. In the comparison of
runners-up, matches against the sixth-placed team were not included. Tie-breaking was
based on head-to-head results used recursively. Consequently, this qualification system
did not satisfy strategy-proofness according to Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.1 also covers UEFA Euro 2016 qualifying with 53 teams drawn into eight
groups of six and one group of five teams such that the group winners, runners-up, and the
best third-placed team (such that the results against the sixth-placed team are discarded)
directly qualify to the finals and the eight remaining third-placed teams contest play-offs
to determine the last four qualifiers for the finals.
The first incentive incompatible FIFA World Cup qualifications for the European zone
is the 1998 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) with four groups of six teams and five
groups of five teams. The runners-up would be ranked according to their records against
the first, third and fourth-placed team in their groups, and the team with the best record
qualified, while the others advanced to play-offs.
However, the 2002 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) again satisfied strategy-
proofness as all group winners qualified and among the runners-up, the one from Group 2
was drawn randomly to advance to an intercontinental play-off, while the other second-
placed teams advanced to UEFA play-offs.
In the 2006 qualifying, group winners qualified to the World Cup, and the runners-up
would be ranked such that results against the seventh placed team were ignored (there
were three groups with seven and five with six teams) for the sake of fairness. The two
best ranked second-placed teams qualified and the other six runners-up were drawn into
play-offs. The second and third tie-breaking criteria were head-to-head number of points
and goal difference, but they were not used recursively. Nevertheless, this qualification
system does not satisfy strategy-proofness due to Theorem 5.1.
2010 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) contained eight groups with six teams and
one group with five. The nine group winners qualified directly, while the best eight second-
placed teams contested play-offs. The second tie-breaking criterion was goal difference
again. In determining the worst runner-up to be eliminated, the results against teams
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finishing last in the six team groups were not counted for consistency, opening a way to
manipulation.
To summarize, on the basis of theoretical results presented in Section 5, at least nine
recent incentive incompatible qualifications (to the 1996, 2000, 2012 and 2016 UEFA
European Championships as well as to the 1998, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 FIFA World
Cups in the European Zone) can be identified.14
7 Discussion
Our findings described in the previous section carry a really frightening message for FIFA
and UEFA: it has had a positive probability that a serious scandal occurs during a recent
qualification to UEFA European Championships or FIFA World Cups, for example, in
October 2017 as shown in a detailed example. In a sense, it would be even more disturbing
than the ’Nichtsangriffspakt von Gijo´n’ as one team would have an incentive not only to
stop attacking, but to kick an own goal. Furthermore, it would be a more unfair case than
Barbados vs. Grenada (1994 Caribbean Cup qualification) as the outcome of this match
has not affected the qualification of any third team.
On the other hand, in the unlikely, yet possible scenario presented in the proof of
Theorem 4.1, Luxembourg has practically no incentive to interfere in the manipulation
of Bulgaria in order to prevent the elimination of Montenegro. Luxembourg may even
interested in scoring a goal to be the fifth in the group. Fortunately, this situation has
not materialized, and currently we do not know about any attempt to manipulate these
qualifications in the way presented above.
Nevertheless, lack of dishonest behaviour is not an argument for diminishing the value
of strategy-proofness, which can sometimes be satisfied without significantly changing the
rules. For instance, in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), the root of the
problem resides in the difference of group and second-places teams ranking by discarding
the matches against the sixth-placed teams in the latter case. The greatest pity about this
situation is that it could have been straightforward to avoid by UEFA ditching the strange
policy of ignoring some group matches, since all groups would have six teams following the
admission of Gibraltar and Kosovo. Yet they chose not to modify the rules. According to
a recent UEFA News (UEFA, 2017), which was released on 10 October 2017, after the end
of group stage: ’the exclusion of results against sixth-placed teams was retained to alleviate
any possible imbalance between the qualifying groups caused by the late introductions of
Gibraltar and Kosovo’. While it is respectable that organizers have wanted to prevent some
mathematically unprovable imbalances between the groups, it should be clear that they
have sacrificed the much more clear and important issue of incentive compatibility.
However, it is necessary to show a mechanism providing strategy-proofness in order
to argue against the rules of recent qualifications. While it was convenient in the case of
2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), when all groups had the same number of
14 We have also examined 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifiers of the other five confederations, AFC
(Asian Football Confederation), CAF (Confederation of African Football), CONCAFAC (Confederation of
North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football), CONMEBOL (South American Football
Confederation) and OCF (Oceania Football Confederation). In the second round of AFC qualification, 40
teams were divided into eight groups of five teams such that the eight group winners and the four best
runners-up advance to the third round. As a result of Indonesia being disqualified due to FIFA suspension,
one group contained only four teams compared to five teams in all other groups. Therefore, the results
against the fifth-placed team were not counted in the ranking of runners-up according to the related AFC
regulation (AFC, 2015, Case 2).
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teams, this condition cannot be guaranteed in all cases. So let us examine Theorem 5.2
and search for some strategy-proof qualification systems:
a) There is only one group: While it can implemented if the number of teams is
not large (see 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (CONMEBOL), the South
American section of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification, which is also an
excellent example for the cooperation of football governing bodies and the academic
community (Dura´n et al., 2017)), it is certainly not an option with more than
10-12 teams.
b) There is no need for an extra group: It holds if all groups have the same number
of teams, which may conflict with divisibility. However, we suggest to choose this
solution when it can be implemented.
c) There is no difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group: It practically
means that all second- or third-placed teams either qualify or advance to play-offs
regardless that some groups may have more teams. For example, the allocation
rule used in UEFA Euro 2004 qualifying (the top team in each group automatically
qualifies, and the runners-up are paired for play-offs) is strategy-proof.
d) Teams considered in the extra group have played no matches against teams ranked
lower in the group, which are counted in the extra group : If there are around
50 competing teams, it requires small group sizes (implying few group matches,
therefore randomness is increased), standard group sizes with more rounds (which
increases the number of matches to be played by a given team), or to discard
many matches in the extra group, so it is not advised to use.
e) Matches to be discarded in the extra group are independent of group results: We
think it could be the ultimate solution. Social choice theory usually wants to
avoid the violation of anonymity at all costs, but see how groups are seeded: if
𝑛 teams should be drawn into 𝑘 groups, there would be 𝑘 teams in Pot 1, 𝑘
teams in Pot 2 and so on, until Pot 𝑚 with 𝑘 < ℓ < 2𝑘 (as in UEFA Euro 2008
qualifying) or with ℓ ≤ 𝑘 (as in 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)) is
reached. Consequently, difference in group sizes is caused by Pot 𝑚, so it is fair
and straightforward to discard matches against the team in Pot 𝑚 for the ranking
in the extra group, which immediately provides strategy-proofness according to
Theorem 5.2.
In the case of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) it means to fix in
advance that matches played against teams in Pot 6 (Luxembourg, Andorra,
San Marino, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Liechtenstein as well as the lately
introduced Gibraltar and Kosovo) are discarded in the comparison of second-
placed teams. Note that only Luxembourg and Georgia reached the fifth position
in the qualification from Pot 6, so this policy makes not much difference in
practice.
Nevertheless, a problem may arise when a team from Pot 𝑚 should be considered
in the extra group due its unexpectedly good performance.15 While it is an unlikely
scenario,16 it can be immediately solved by discarding the match against the team
in Pot 𝑚− 1 in the case of this team, which does not affect strategy-proofness.
15 We are grateful to De´nes Pa´lvo¨lgyi for spotting this issue.
16 One of the greatest surprise occurred in 2016 UEFA Euro qualifying when Greece finished as the
last team in its group despite it was drawn from Pot 1.
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To summarize, we suggest to follow the subsequent mechanism in order to guarantee
the strategy-proofness of a qualification system: (1) policy b) if the number of teams 𝑛
can be divided by the number of groups 𝑘; (2) policy c) if 𝑛 is not divisible by 𝑘 but teams
in the extra group can be treated uniformly (it is impossible if the extra group contains
an odd number of teams); (3) policy e) if the first two policies cannot be implemented.
Another solution might be an artificial reduction of the number of teams for the sake of
achieving equal group size. For instance, the weakest teams (e.g. Gibraltar, Liechtenstein,
San Marino etc.) can be relegated to a special group, where they play against each other
without the possibility of direct qualification. The winner of this extra group may advance
to play-offs with runners-up (or third-placed teams), by playing with the best of them.
Besides excluding manipulation, this solution has the further benefit of giving a chance for
lower-ranked national teams, mainly composed of amateur players, to compete in their
own league and enjoy more success than scoring some lucky goals against professional
sportsmen.17 It is also possible to organize a preliminary round for lower-ranked teams
such as in the CEV qualification for the 2018 FIVB Volleyball Men’s World Championship.
We hope this paper has reinforced our view that the scientific community and the
sports industry should work more closely together in studying the effects of potential rules
and rule changes even before they are implemented. For example, the governing bodies of
major sports may invite academics to identify possible loopholes in proposed regulations
in order to prevent serious scandals.
8 Conclusions
Design of appropriate sport ranking rules is an important theoretical problem of economics
and operations research. Tournament organizers may face unpleasant situations when they
miss analysing strategy-proofness. While manipulation is often a low-probability event,
the potential costs can be enormous. We have demonstrated that decision makers have
chosen a risky strategy in the case of some recent qualification tournaments to the UEFA
European Championships and FIFA World Cups.
There are at least two possible directions for future research. First, a number of similar
rules can be investigated from the perspective of incentive (in)compatibility. We plan to
write some follow-up papers on this topic. Second, similarly to Berker (2014) and Lasek
et al. (2016), the current theory-oriented investigation can be supplemented by estimating
the probability of manipulation with the use of historical and Monte-Carlo simulated data.
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Appendix
Table A.1: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group B
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Switzerland — 2-0 7 Oct 2-0 3-0 1-0
2 Portugal 10 Oct — 3-0 5-1 6-0 4-1
3 Hungary 2-3 0-1 — 10 Oct 4-0 3-1
4 Faroe Islands 0-2 0-6 0-0 — 1-0 7 Oct
5 Andorra 1-2 7 Oct 1-0 0-0 — 0-1
6 Latvia 0-3 0-3 0-2 0-2 10 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
7 October 2017 Faroe Islands Latvia 0-0
7 October 2017 Andorra Portugal 0-3
7 October 2017 Switzerland Hungary 2-0
10 October 2017 Hungary Faroe Islands 2-0
10 October 2017 Latvia Andorra 1-1
10 October 2017 Portugal Switzerland 1-1
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drown; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Switzerland 9 1 0 21 4 17 28
2 Portugal 8 1 1 32 5 27 25
3 Hungary 4 1 5 13 11 2 13
4 Faroe Islands 2 3 5 4 17 -13 9
5 Latvia 1 2 7 4 19 -15 5
6 Andorra 1 2 7 3 21 -18 5
2 Portugal 6 1 1 23 5 18 19
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Table A.2: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group C
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Germany — 2-0 8 Oct 3-0 6-0 7-0
2 Northern Ireland 5 Oct — 4-0 2-0 2-0 4-0
3 Azerbaijan 1-4 0-1 — 5 Oct 1-0 5-1
4 Czech Republic 1-2 0-0 0-0 — 2-1 8 Oct
5 Norway 0-3 8 Oct 2-0 1-1 — 4-1
6 San Marino 0-8 0-3 0-1 0-6 5 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
5 October 2017 Azerbaijan Czech Republic 1-1
5 October 2017 Northern Ireland Germany 0-1
5 October 2017 San Marino Norway 0-2
8 October 2017 Czech Republic San Marino 3-0
8 October 2017 Germany Azerbaijan 2-0
8 October 2017 Norway Northern Ireland 0-0
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drown; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Germany 10 0 0 38 2 36 30
2 Northern Ireland 6 2 2 16 3 13 20
3 Czech Republic 3 4 3 14 10 4 13
4 Norway 3 2 5 10 16 -6 11
5 Azerbaijan 3 2 5 9 15 -6 11
6 San Marino 0 0 10 2 43 -41 0
2 Northern Ireland 4 2 2 9 3 6 14
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Table A.3: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group D
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Serbia — 1-1 2-2 3-2 9 Oct 3-0
2 Wales 1-1 — 9 Oct 1-0 1-1 4-0
3 Republic of Ireland 0-1 0-0 — 1-1 1-0 6 Oct
4 Austria 6 Oct 2-2 0-1 — 1-1 2-0
5 Georgia 1-3 6 Oct 1-1 1-2 — 1-1
6 Moldova 0-3 0-2 1-3 9 Oct 2-2 —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
6 October 2017 Georgia Wales 0-1
6 October 2017 Austria Serbia 0-0
6 October 2017 Republic of Ireland Moldova 2-0
9 October 2017 Moldova Austria 1-2
9 October 2017 Serbia Georgia 1-1
9 October 2017 Wales Republic of Ireland 1-0
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drown; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Serbia 5 5 0 18 8 10 20
2 Wales 5 5 0 14 5 9 20
3 Republic of Ireland 4 4 2 11 7 4 16
4 Austria 3 4 3 12 11 1 13
5 Georgia 0 6 4 9 14 -5 6
6 Moldova 0 2 8 5 24 -19 2
2 Wales 3 5 0 8 5 3 14
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Table A.4: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group E
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Poland — 8 Oct 3-2 3-1 2-1 3-0
2 Montenegro 1-2 — 5 Oct 1-0 4-1 5-0
3 Denmark 4-0 0-1 — 8 Oct 1-0 4-1
4 Romania 0-3 1-1 0-0 — 1-0 5 Oct
5 Armenia 5 Oct 3-2 1-4 0-5 — 2-0
6 Kazakhstan 2-2 0-3 1-3 0-0 8 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
5 October 2017 Armenia Poland 1-5
5 October 2017 Montenegro Denmark 0-0
5 October 2017 Romania Kazakhstan 2-0
8 October 2017 Denmark Romania 1-1
8 October 2017 Kazakhstan Armenia 1-0
8 October 2017 Poland Montenegro 1-1
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drown; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Note: Montenegro is ranked above Denmark due to FIFA (2016, Article 20.6d) because it has obtained 4
points against Denmark, while Denmark has obtained only 1 point against Montenegro.
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Poland 7 2 1 24 13 11 23
2 Montenegro 5 3 2 19 8 11 18
3 Denmark 5 3 2 19 8 11 18
4 Romania 3 4 3 11 9 2 13
5 Armenia 2 0 8 9 25 -16 6
6 Kazakhstan 1 2 7 5 24 -19 5
2 Montenegro 3 3 2 12 6 6 12
26
Table A.5: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group F
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 England — 2-1 5 Oct 3-0 2-0 2-0
2 Slovakia 0-1 — 1-0 3-0 4-0 8 Oct
3 Slovenia 0-0 1-0 — 8 Oct 4-0 2-0
4 Scotland 2-2 5 Oct 1-0 — 1-1 2-0
5 Lithuania 8 Oct 1-2 2-2 0-3 — 2-0
6 Malta 0-4 1-3 0-1 1-5 5 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
5 October 2017 England Slovenia 2-1
5 October 2017 Malta Lithuania 0-1
5 October 2017 Scotland Slovakia 0-0
8 October 2017 Lithuania England 1-3
8 October 2017 Slovakia Malta 3-0
8 October 2017 Slovenia Scotland 1-0
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drown; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 England 8 2 0 21 5 16 26
2 Slovakia 6 1 3 17 6 11 19
3 Slovenia 5 2 3 12 6 6 17
4 Scotland 4 3 3 14 11 3 15
5 Lithuania 2 2 6 8 21 -13 8
6 Malta 0 0 10 2 25 -23 0
2 Slovakia 4 1 3 11 5 6 13
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Table A.6: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group G
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Spain — 3-0 6 Oct 4-1 4-0 8-0
2 Italy 1-1 — 2-0 1-0 6 Oct 5-0
3 Albania 0-2 9 Oct — 0-3 2-1 2-0
4 Israel 9 Oct 1-3 0-3 — 0-1 2-1
5 FYR Macedonia 1-2 2-3 1-1 1-2 — 9 Oct
6 Liechtenstein 0-8 0-4 0-2 6 Oct 0-3 —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
6 October 2017 Italy FYR Macedonia 2-0
6 October 2017 Liechtenstein Israel 0-1
6 October 2017 Spain Albania 3-1
9 October 2017 Albania Italy 1-2
9 October 2017 Israel Spain 0-3
9 October 2017 FYR Macedonia Liechtenstein 2-1
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drown; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Spain 9 1 0 36 3 33 28
2 Italy 8 1 1 23 8 15 25
3 Albania 4 1 5 12 14 -2 13
4 Israel 4 0 6 10 17 -7 12
5 FYR Macedonia 3 1 6 12 17 -5 10
6 Liechtenstein 0 0 10 2 36 -34 0
2 Italy 6 1 1 14 8 6 19
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Table A.7: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group H
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Bosnia and Herz. stands for Bosnia and Herzegovina
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Belgium — 4-0 1-1 10 Oct 8-1 9-0
2 Bosnia and Herz. 7 Oct — 0-0 2-0 5-0 5-0
3 Greece 1-2 1-1 — 2-0 0-0 10 Oct
4 Cyprus 0-3 3-2 7 Oct — 0-0 3-1
5 Estonia 0-2 10 Oct 0-2 1-0 — 4-0
6 Gibraltar 0-6 0-4 1-4 1-2 7 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
7 October 2017 Gibraltar Estonia 0-1
7 October 2017 Bosnia and Herzegovina Belgium 0-3
7 October 2017 Cyprus Greece 0-1
10 October 2017 Belgium Cyprus 3-1
10 October 2017 Estonia Bosnia and Herzegovina 1-2
10 October 2017 Greece Gibraltar 3-0
(c) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Belgium 9 1 0 40 4 36 28
2 Greece 5 4 1 15 5 10 19
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 5 2 3 21 11 10 17
4 Cyprus 3 1 5 9 16 -7 11
5 Estonia 3 2 5 8 19 -11 11
6 Gibraltar 0 0 10 3 41 -38 0
2 Greece 3 4 1 8 4 4 13
29
Table A.8: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group I
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Croatia — 2-0 1-1 1-0 6 Oct 1-0
2 Iceland 1-0 — 2-0 2-0 3-2 9 Oct
3 Turkey 1-0 6 Oct — 2-2 2-0 2-0
4 Ukraine 9 Oct 1-1 2-0 — 1-0 3-0
5 Finland 0-1 1-0 9 Oct 1-2 — 1-1
6 Kosovo 0-6 1-2 1-4 6 Oct 0-1 —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
6 October 2017 Croatia Finland 2-0
6 October 2017 Kosovo Ukraine 0-2
6 October 2017 Turkey Iceland 2-1
9 October 2017 Finland Turkey 0-1
9 October 2017 Iceland Kosovo 1-0
9 October 2017 Ukraine Croatia 0-0
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drown; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Croatia 6 2 2 14 3 11 20
2 Turkey 6 2 2 14 9 5 20
3 Ukraine 5 3 2 13 7 6 19
4 Iceland 6 1 3 13 9 4 19
5 Finland 2 1 7 6 12 -6 7
6 Kosovo 0 1 9 3 23 -20 1
2 Turkey 4 2 2 8 8 0 14
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